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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MEDICAID EXPANSION, CROWD-OUT, AND LIMITS OF
INCREMENTAL REFORM

JOHN V. JACOBI*
Medicaid is the cornerstone of America’s efforts to bring health insurance
coverage to the poor and disabled. It anchors the public side of our mixed
public-private system, which seeks to provide coverage for the poor, elderly
and disabled, leaving all others to obtain coverage through private markets.
But this system has an enormous gap: 45 million Americans are covered
neither by public nor private insurance. Even in prosperous times, that gap is
growing. In the absence of national interest in a dramatic shift in health
finance, our mixed public-private system must adjust to reverse, or at least
keep up with this trend. No health finance task is more important, as those
without insurance coverage suffer increased risk of sickness and earlier death,
as well as exposure to impoverishment caused by health expenditures.
Incremental efforts over the past fifteen years have attempted reform
within the public-private system by targeting relief to those in the gap between
private coverage and existing public programs. Medicaid, along with its new
sister program, Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”), has played a
central role in the legislative attempts to knit together more closely the
American system of health coverage.1 The reality of growing ranks of
uninsured low-income families has sparked further interest in incremental
reform through public program expansion. As with past efforts, these reforms
seek to provide coverage for low-income uninsured, while maintaining the
private employment-based insurance system as the dominant source of health
coverage.2
This Article examines one potentially significant factor determining the
success of incremental reform: the problem of the displacement of private

* Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Health Law & Policy Program, Seton Hall Law
School. I am grateful for the comments on an earlier version of this paper by the participants in
the symposium sponsored by the Center for Health Law Studies at the Saint Louis University
School of Law, “Taking the Pulse of Medicaid,” and in particular for the helpful comments of
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Sara Rosenbaum and Sidney Watson. I wish to thank Louise Trubek for
her valuable assistance. I am also grateful to Alexander R. Shekhdar for his research assistance.
Any errors are my own.
1. See infra notes 43-44.
2. See discussion infra Part II.
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coverage by public program expansion. Efforts to reduce uninsurance by
expanding public programs is demonstrably displacing private coverage to a
small, but probably growing degree. Crowd-out, as this displacement is
known, occurs at the boundaries between public and private systems.3 As
public programs expand, some of the new beneficiaries are not long-time
uninsured, but rather are workers or their dependents who drop or forego
private coverage. This displacement of private coverage raises the price of
incremental reform, and marginally weakens the private insurance system.
This displacement is a minor problem today. Recent attempts to expand
public insurance have been troubled more by a shortage of applicants than by
massive flight from private coverage.4 In the near term, displacement of
private coverage is unlikely to rise to levels high enough to justify public
policy concern. However, Congress has mandated a study of the issue in
connection with one recent expansion, CHIP.5 While state and federal officials
have been diverted to the more important task of identifying, enrolling and
retaining eligible children, the issue of displacement has received little
attention. However, the studies are likely to bring the issue back to the
forefront if officials overreact to reports of some level of crowd-out. It is one
thesis of this Article that such overreaction can be avoided if officials
anticipate some reasonable level of crowd-out and respond to its emergence
proportionately and reasonably.
The second thesis of this Article is that crowd-out serves as a true marker
of a fundamental fault in our mixed health finance system, and that the
phenomenon of crowd-out challenges the notion that we are well-served by
shoring-up the private employment-based system as our dominant source of
coverage. It is a tenet of incrementalism that the rate of uninsurance may be
reduced through government subsidization of health insurance for those near
the border between public programs and private coverage. For this to be done
“efficiently” (without eroding private coverage and minimizing the public cost
of expanding coverage), those with access to private coverage must be barred
from the new opportunities for public subsidy. But, as the cost-sharing
obligations of insured low-income workers increase, barriers to enrollment in
public plans are ineffective unless draconian, and if draconian, they seem to
clash with the fundamental goals of equitable access to government subsidy
and reliable and continuous access to insurance coverage for all Americans.
Therefore, the now-minor problem of crowd-out signals an opportunity to
reconsider the fundamental mix of private and public coverage in our health
finance system.

3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. See infra notes 80-103.
5. See infra notes 133-36.
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Part I of this Article describes the trend of increased uninsurance and
discusses why this trend poses a significant public policy problem. It then
discusses the current incrementalist strategy of expanding public programs to
reduce uninsurance. Part II describes crowd-out as a phenomenon by which
insurance expansion efforts exhibit less than surgical precision, displacing
private insurance to some extent. Part III evaluates the significance of crowdout, arguing that crowd-out is best understood in the near term as a minor
wrinkle in an otherwise smooth course of incremental reform. It goes on to
argue that crowd-out may be seen as more than a technical glitch in public
program expansion, but instead reveals substantial faults in our public-private
finance system. Ultimately, if workplace economics continues to cause
shrinkage in the rate of employment-based coverage, public programs may be
forced from their current stop-gap role to one of the dominant sources of
insurance for working Americans.
I.

THE EROSION OF PRIVATE INSURANCE COVERAGE AND THE EXPANSION OF
MEDICAID

A.

The Private Side: The Problem of Uninsurance

It is tempting to permit the numbers to speak for themselves when
discussing modern health coverage trends. The percentage of non-elderly
Americans without health coverage rose from 13.8% in 1977 to 19.2% in
1996,6 and the trend has continued.7 Those living below the poverty level
fared the worst, with thirty-five percent of the non-elderly uninsured,8 but the
“near-poor” fared little better, at thirty-two percent.9 Even these numbers tend
to underestimate the extent of the problem. Many people not counted among
the ranks of the uninsured nevertheless suffer breaks in health coverage.
About 71.5 million Americans were without health insurance for some portion
of 1998.10 In addition, a large and growing number of families—perhaps as

6. Jon R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977-1998: The Accidental System Under
Scrutiny, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 71.
7. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES,
1999 WITH HEALTH AND AGING CHARTBOOK 14 (1999) (reporting that the total percentage
(including the elderly) uninsured rose from 15.6% in 1996 to 16.1% in 1997).
8. See ELLEN O’BRIEN & JUDITH FEDER, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ITS DECLINE: THE
GROWING PLIGHT OF LOW-WAGE WORKERS (1999), available at http://www.kff.org/contents/
1999/2134/2801plightoflowwageworkers.pdf.
9. Id. The “near poor” have incomes between 100% and 199% of poverty. Id.
10. Robert Kuttner, The American Health Care System: Health Insurance Coverage, 340
NEW ENG. J. MED. 163, 164 (1999). See Stuart H. Altman et al., Healthcare for the Poor and
Uninsured: An Uncertain Future, in THE FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WHO WILL CARE
FOR THE POOR AND UNINSURED? 2-3 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE
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many as those without any coverage— are “underinsured,” meaning that their
insurance does not protect them from spending ten percent or more of their
family income on health care.11
The lack of health insurance is more than a financial matter. It is a matter
of health, and indeed of life and death. “A substantial body of literature
demonstrates that people without health insurance are less likely to seek
medical care, less likely to get it, and, as a result, are likely to experience
worse health and higher death rates than people who have insurance
protection.”12 The problems raised by uninsurance are particularly acute for
children, for whom the lack of insurance means deprivation of preventive care
such as routine diagnostic and screening examinations and immunizations, as
well as care for chronic childhood conditions such as asthma and ear
infections, at a time when such deprivation will have maximum impact on
physical and cognitive development.13
The statistics on uninsurance spell at least short-term problems for
American workers and their families. The longer-term issues revolve around
the reasons for this decrease in private insurance coverage, and the prospects
for future improvement, or, alternatively, further erosion in employment-based
coverage. The ranks of the uninsured are swollen with low-income workers
who are either not offered insurance, or are offered it on terms that require a
level of cost sharing that they cannot, or will not, meet. The uninsured

FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM] (“[N]early 24% of those interviewed in March 1995 had
been uninsured in the week prior to the interview. Among those under age 65, this number jumps
from 24% to nearly 27% . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
11. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health Insurance: R.I.P., in THE FUTURE U.S.
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 325 (“To be uninsured means that gaps in coverage
leave an insured family exposed to a significant risk of losing a large fraction of its income to
illness.”). See Kuttner, supra note 10, at 165-66 (reporting rising rates of uninsurance, defined as
gaps in insurance coverage leading to out-of-pocket expenditures of ten percent or more of family
income on health care).
12. Diane Rowland et al., Uninsured in America: The Causes and Consequences, in THE
FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 25. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DOES HEALTH INSURANCE MAKE A DIFFERENCE? BACKGROUND
PAPER 18-19 (1992) (“[T]here is considerable evidence that the activities of health professionals
in caring for patients may vary in relation to the insurance status of the patient . . . . [I]nsurance
coverage plays a role in decisions to order procedures or otherwise use health resources . . . .
[However,] studies which attempt to demonstrate direct relationships between the activities of
health professionals in caring for patients and the outcomes of that care in terms of patient health
are scarce.”) (citation omitted).
13. Kuttner, supra note 10, at 165. See Families USA, One Out Of Three: Kids Without
Health Insurance 1995-96 (March 1997), at http://www.familiesusa.org/kwohi.html (last visited
Aug. 14, 2000); Jeffrey J. Stoddard et al., Health Insurance Status and Ambulatory Care for
Children, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1421 (1994).
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overwhelmingly (seventy-three percent)14 are in families with at least one full
time worker,15 most of whom work in low-wage jobs.16 The problem of
uninsurance therefore increasingly concerns the working poor, and not only the
destitute unemployed.17
Several closely-related trends converge to explain the erosion of insurance
coverage among the working poor. The cost of employee health coverage has
risen in relation to background inflation over the last fifteen years.18 This
inflationary trend flattened in the mid-1990s,19 due in part to the one-time
effects of the general shift to managed care financing.20 In more recent years,

14. See O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 2. Eighty-five percent of the uninsured live in
families with at least one full or part-time worker. Id.
15. Id. Seventy-nine percent of uninsured persons with family incomes between 100% and
199% of the poverty level live in a family with at least one full-time worker; 90% of the
uninsured near-poor live in families with at least one full-time or part-time worker. Id.
16. Id. at 2. See JOHN HOLAHAN & NIALL BRENNAN, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, WHO ARE
THE ADULT UNINSURED? 4 (2000), available at http://www.newfederalism.urban.org/htm/
series_b/b14/b14.htm (only twenty-one percent of low income (i.e., income below 200% of the
federal poverty level) live in families without a worker).
17. One group of the very poor has not benefited from recent Medicaid expansions: childless
adults without permanent and total disabilities remain outside the reach of federal public
insurance programs. See Rowland et al., supra note 12, at 30.
18. Katherine Levitt et al., Health Spending in 1998: Signals of Change, HEALTH AFF., Jan.Feb. 2000, at 125.
19. Id. at 124-25.
20. See Kuttner, supra note 10, at 166-67 (“Although managed care dramatically reduced the
inflation in health insurance costs for employers in the mid-1990s, this seems to have been a onetime savings. The underlying demographic and technological trends are unchanged, and
employers and benefit consultants report sharply rising premiums in 1999.”). The cost-savings
derived from the general adoption of managed care financing flowed from the superior ability of
managed care plans to bargain with health care providers for price savings. The savings are “onetime” in the sense that the benefits of this bargaining with respect at least to hospital and other
institutional services seem to have squeezed about as much marginal benefit to the plan as can be
reached without seriously challenging the solvency of these institutional providers. See also, The
Balanced Budget Act of 1997: A Look at the Current Impact on Patients and Providers:
Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Health and Environment, Committee on Commerce
(2000) (statement of Gail R. Wilensky, Chair, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission),
available at http://com-notes.house.gov/cchear/hearings106nsf (last visited Aug. 8, 2000)
(although hospital revenues have suffered from federal reimbursement changes, three-quarters of
the decline in margin from 1997 to 1998 are attributable to payment policies of private managed
care plans; reductions in margin are sufficient to trouble financial markets); Peter Wehrwein,
Follow the Shrinking Managed Care Savings, MANAGED CARE MAG., Jan. 1999, at 32 (managed
care has squeezed out excess cost in health care delivery, is now casting about to achieve savings
through other means). That the savings are “one-time” is not to minimize their importance. If, as
it appears, health insurance inflation is returning (mostly due to factors beyond the control of
managed care, including the aging of the population and the continuing development of
efficacious new pharmaceuticals and technologies), costs will at least rise from a lower cost base
as a result of the savings realized by managed care.
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however, health insurance inflation is back, with premium increases that
approach the double-digit levels of the early 1990s.21 As a result of this
inflation, employers are facing sharply increasing costs for employee health
coverage.22
At the same time, the American workplace is changing in ways that have
made health coverage for low-wage workers less available. Jobs in the “new
economy,” although increasing in number, have shifted slowly from large to
small firms, from full-time to part-time jobs and from manufacturing to
personal services.23 As a result, the increase in the number of jobs in this
economy does not translate into broad economic advancement for the working
poor. One other important change in the workplace in recent years has been
the growing gap in income between the rich and poor. Since 1980, while the
real (inflation adjusted) income of the wealthiest rose, the income levels of
families in the bottom twenty percent of income distribution fell in inflationadjusted terms.24 The experience of falling real wages was visited with
particular force on less educated workers, who will be unable to advance in an
increasingly information-based and technology-hungry economy.25

21. See JOEL E. MILLER, NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, DEJA VU ALL OVER
AGAIN: THE SOARING COST OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
AND EMPLOYERS 5-7 (2000), available at http://www/nchc.org/survey.html (n.d.); Levitt et al.,
supra note 18, at 131-32.
22. Levitt et al., supra note 18, at 131-32.
23. Kuttner supra note 10, at 167; Jon R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977-1998:
The Accidental System Under Scrutiny, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 72.
24. O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 12 (“Between 1979 and 1995, the average real wage
stagnated and wage inequality increased as high-wage workers received real gains, while the
remainder of the wage structure fell . . . . [R]eal wages declined for lower paid and less-educated
men and women, as well as for workers in low-skill occupations, while real wages rose for highly
paid and more educated workers and those in high-skill occupations.”). See PAUL KRUGMAN,
PEDDLING PROSPERITY 130-35 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1994) (noting that the income of the
families in the top one percent doubled from 1977-1989, while that of families in the bottom forty
percent fell).
25. Joel F. Handler, Low-Wage Work “As We Know It”: What’s Wrong/What Can Be Done,
in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 4 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie
White eds. 1999) [hereinafter HARD LABOR].
The principal reason for the growing inequality and poverty is the decline in the real
earnings of the less skilled, less educated workers over the past twenty-five years. In
1973, for men, with one to three years of high school, the median income was $24,079
(1989 dollars); in 1989, it was $14,439. For men with a high school diploma, income
dropped from $30,252 to $21,650. For women, with one to three years of high school, the
median earnings were $7,920 in 1973; by 1989, they dropped to $6,752. For women with
a high school degree, the figures were $11,087 (1973) and $10,439 (1989). Furthermore,
the decline in income was not due to the shift in jobs from manufacturing to service; the
real wages declined in both sectors.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Low-wage and less educated men experienced the largest drop in real wages.
The lowest-paid men (the bottom 20 percent of male wage earners) saw their
real wages fall by 17 percent between 1979 and 1995, while real wages
increased by one percent for the top 20 percent of men. Earnings declined
precipitously for less educated men. Wages for men with less than a high
school education dropped by 27 percent and wages for high school graduates
dropped 17 percent. In contrast, wages for male college graduates rose.
Similarly, men in professional occupations saw their wages rise, while men in
low-skilled jobs experienced real wage declines.26

Coupled with the loss of real wages, low-income workers have lost ground
in employment-based health coverage. In 1996, 93.4% of high-wage workers27
were offered health benefits by their employers, while only 42.7% of low-wage
workers28 were offered coverage.29 This gap had grown substantially in just
the ten years from 1987 to 1996. The offer rate for high-wage workers rose
from 87.1% to 93.4%, while the offer rate for low-wage workers fell from
43.4% to 42.7%.30 But even among low-wage workers, the loss of coverage
has been uneven. Full-time workers with twelve months or more tenure in
their jobs have tended to continue to be offered coverage, while “peripheral”31
workers—newer full-time workers and part-time workers—are less likely to be
offered coverage than were similarly situated workers in the past.32 This trend
seems ominous, as the “new economy” encourages workers frequently to
change jobs, and to accept part-time employment.33
26. O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 13.
27. “High wage workers” for these purposes are workers earning more than $15.00 per hour
in 1996 dollars. See Phillip F. Cooper & Barbara Steinberg Schone, More Offers, Fewer Takers
for Employment-Based Health Insurance: 1987 And 1996, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 145.
28. “Low wage worker” for these purposes are workers earning less than $15.00 per hour in
1996 dollars. See id., at 145.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Henry S. Farber & Helen Levy, Recent Trends in Employment Sponsored Health
Insurance Coverage: Are Bad Jobs Getting Worse?, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 93, 94 (2000) (defining
“peripheral” jobs).
32. See id. at 102.
33. One recent study suggests that the extremely tight labor market of the late 1990s has
produced a increase in the number of persons covered by employment-based insurance. John
Holahan & Johnny Kim, Why Does The Number Of Uninsured Americans Continue to Grow?,
HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2000, at 194. This upturn, however, was largely explained by the
movement of previously unemployed persons into employment, and does not suggest a change in
the likelihood that those with jobs would obtain coverage. Id. at 194-95. The phenomenon
seems, therefore, to be related to an extremely high rate of employment, and not to any dramatic
shift in the likelihood that an employed person will be offered or accept health insurance. As
America is near full employment levels, the increase of employment-based coverage by virtue of
an increase in the rate of employment cannot continue. A flattening or downturn in the economy
would, then, contribute to perhaps a quite steep drop in employment based-coverage. See id. at
196.
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Another tool used by employers reacting to increases in health premiums
has been the increasing imposition of employee cost-sharing for health
coverage. The effect of this trend has been to exacerbate the disparity in health
coverage by discouraging low-wage workers from accepting private coverage
even when it is offered. There has been a striking fall-off in the rate at which
workers opt for, or “take up” employment-based insurance. As the price of
health coverage has risen, employers have, in addition to reducing access to
coverage, increased employees’ share of health premiums.34 In addition to the
simple goal of cost savings, employers have increased the employee share of
premiums to encourage workers to take advantage of other opportunities for
coverage—including the opportunity for coverage as a dependent under a
spouse’s policy.35 The increase in cost-shifting from employer to employee
has been dramatic in recent years.
Between 1985 and 1995, the proportion of workers making no direct
contribution to premiums for worker-only coverage dropped by 30 percentage
points, from 64 percent to 33 percent, and workers’ average monthly
contributions increased as workers paid a larger share of higher premiums. In
fact, workers’ contributions increased more rapidly than premiums.36

The employee share of premium for dependent coverage was even higher.
The sample costs of family coverage in one recent study found that the
employee share was three times higher than the employee share for workeronly coverage,37 with the employee responsible for a higher percentage of the
total premium cost for family than single coverage.38
The increase in cost-sharing affects low-wage workers most drastically.39
That this should be so is hardly surprising, as a worker earning $15,000 per
year is less able to cover increasing monthly health premiums than one earning
$40,000 per year. The effect was demonstrated in a recent study comparing
insurance take-up by income level for the years 1987 and 1996:
For workers earning less than seven dollars per hour (in 1996 dollars), offer
rates were virtually the same in both years, but access rates declined
significantly. Offer rates and access rates for high-wage workers (those
earning more than ten dollars per hour) increased over the same period. The
disparity in both individual and family take-up rates by wages was also greater

34. O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 17; THOMAS RICE ET AL., THE KAISER COMMISSION
ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, TRENDS IN JOB-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 31-

32 (1998), available at www.kff.org; Cooper & Schone, supra note 27, at 147.
35. See David Dranove et al., “Competition” Among Employers Offering Health Insurance,
19 J. HEALTH ECON. 121, 137-38 (2000).
36. RICE ET AL., supra note 34, at 32.
37. Id. at 64 tbl.A-10.
38. Id. at 63-64 (comparing Table A-7 with Table A-10).
39. See Richard Kronick & Todd Gilmer, Explaining the Decline in Health Insurance
Coverage, 1979-1995, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 36-37.
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in 1996, with workers earning ten dollars or less per hour having greater
declines in take-up rates over the time period than higher-wage workers had.40

Low-income workers simply have too many preexisting calls on their income
to add substantial health insurance cost sharing. Studies performed in the
1990s of low-income workers who were offered subsidized health coverage
suggests a direct relationship between the level of cost sharing and the rate at
which the offer was taken up. As cost sharing exceeded nominal amounts,
low-income families quickly found themselves unable or unwilling to divert
funds to health insurance.41
In sum, the erosion of health coverage among low-income workers is not a
matter of isolated happenstance, but rather is explicable in terms of those
workers’ position in relation to long-term trends in the labor market. First, the
cost of health coverage is rising at a rate well beyond both background
inflation and wage inflation, after a lull in the mid-1990s. In addition,
employers are responding to these increases by reducing the availability of
health coverage, particularly to part-time and new full-time workers, and
increasing employee responsibility for health premiums for those to whom
they continue to offer coverage. Simultaneously, the wages of low-income
workers have been stagnant or declining in real terms for decades; therefore,
these workers are less able to meet the growing demands for health benefits
cost sharing. Under these circumstances, low-income workers are, in
unprecedented numbers, either not offered coverage or are declining it due to
high cost. As a result, a cascade of circumstances have come together to drive
large numbers of low-income workers and their families from private
insurance, and there is no indication that these forces will abate in the near
future. The employment-based health insurance system is simply failing lowincome workers.

40. Cooper & Schone, supra note 27, at 146.
41. See ANNE MARKUS ET AL., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH AND
POLICY, CHIP, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND COST SHARING: LESSONS FROM THE
LITERATURE 6-7 (1998). Low income families, although eager to protect themselves from the
cost of uninsured coverage, were influenced in their rate of take up by two factors: “(1) the
amount of disposable income they have to spend on health insurance as opposed to other goods
(e.g., food, clothing); and (2) the price of the coverage (the premium).” Id. at 6. One study
included in the report found that uninsured low income families enrolled in subsidized coverage
at a rate of fifty-seven percent if premium was set at one percent of income, at thirty percent if
premium was set at three percent of income, and at eighteen percent if premium was set at five
percent of income. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

88

B.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:79

The Public Side: The Expansion of Medicaid

The increase in the number of workers without health insurance has
spurred interest in expanding eligibility in Medicaid 42 or in Medicaid’s sister
program, CHIP.43 Other avenues have been proposed for exploration,
including larger systemic reform44 and incremental reform through methods
other than the expansion of public programs.45 But the public remains wary of
large-scale changes, and the private market, particularly that for individuals
and small groups, seems incapable of providing a platform for reduction in the
number of uninsured despite recent legislative tinkering.46 As a result, many
proposals for incremental reforms aimed at the working uninsured and their
families have focused on Medicaid and CHIP expansion.47
42. Medicaid is Title XIX of the Social Security Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
43. The State Children’s Health Insurance Program is Title XXI of the Social Security Act
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa - 1397jj (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
44. Bill Bradley, for example, described a comprehensive plan for near-universal coverage
in the course of his unsuccessful campaign for the Democratic Party’s nomination for President of
the United States. His proposal would mandate the purchase of coverage for all children, the cost
of which would be supported by federal subsidy at lower income level; the subsidization of
coverage of persons aged 18 through 64 through private markets or the plans available through
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program; and, for those 65 and older, the enrichment of
Medicare through the addition of prescription drug benefits and social care benefits. See The
Bradley Health Care Proposal: America’s Health and America’s System of Health Care,
available at http://billbradley.com/bin/article.pl?;path=270999 (last visited Aug. 9, 2000).
45. See Mark Pauly et al., Individual Versus Job-Based Health Insurance: Weighing the
Pros and Cons, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 37-39 (suggesting modifications in the market
for individual health insurance as a means of reducing uninsurance). George W. Bush, at this
writing the nominee of the Republican Party for President of the United States, has proposed (in
addition to modifications in public programs) modifications in private markets, federal vouchers
(“health credits”) in amounts up to $1,000 per person and $2,000 per family for the purchase of
health coverage and expansions in Medical Savings Account programs in order to make health
coverage more broadly available. See Helping Individuals and Small Businesses Purchase
Health Insurance, available at http://www.georgewbush.com/issues/domestic/healthcare/
points.asp (last visited June 20, 2000).
46. See Len M. Nichols, State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?, 25 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 175, 194-95 (2000). Recent attempts at “market reform” in the individual and
small group markets have had minimal if any success in increasing net access to coverage;
instead, they appear to have made access to coverage better for some (usually the high risk
enrollees) and worse for others (usually the low risk enrollees). Id.
47. See Al Gore Unveils Agenda to Improve Health Care for America’s Families, at
http://www.algore2000.com/agenda/agenda_healthcare.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2000)
(Presidential candidate Al Gore describes as the first two points on his health care agenda the
expansion of Medicaid and CHIP to cover all children); On the Issues: Helping Individuals and
Small Businesses Purchase Health Insurance, available at http://www.georgewbush.com/issues/
domestic/healthcare/points.asp (last visited June 20, 2000) (Presidential candidate George W.
Bush proposes to modify CHIP to give states “freedom to innovate and expand coverage of the
uninsured . . . so that more eligible people can be reached.”); AMERICAN HOSPITAL
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Medicaid was created in 1965,48 in order to “provide a more effective
medical assistance program for welfare recipients and to extend medical
assistance to additional persons with low income.”49 Initially, Medicaid
eligibility was associated with cash-support welfare programs which were
targeted at the “deserving” poor50—those persons who were both poor and
“categorically” eligible: members of families with children and single parents,
the elderly, the blind and the disabled.51 Medicaid’s eligibility philosophy
began to shift in the 1980s. Between 1984 and 1991, eligibility expanded to
include families with two parents present and to pregnant women and children
at increasing income levels.52 By the end of the 1980s, Medicaid had emerged
from its role as an adjunct to cash assistance programs and was available to a
wide variety of categorically eligible people regardless of their participation in
cash assistance programs.53
In the 1990s, coverage moved further from prior welfare roots.54 One
manifestation of the growing breadth of the public programs is the wide use of
§ 111555 and § 191556 waivers, the use of which permits states to expand

ASSOCIATION, INCREMENTAL SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVING AND INCREASING HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE FOR THE UNINSURED (1999), available at http://www.aha.org/about/campaign/
1299uninsuredsoln.html (explaining proposal for incremental reform that includes expansion of
CHIP to include family members of eligible children and expansion of Medicaid to include lowincome childless adults).
48. Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v).
49. Laurens H. Silver & Mark Edelstein, Medicaid: Title XIX of the Social Security Act—A
Review and Analysis—Part I, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 239 (1970) (footnote omitted) (citing
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION §1000 (Supp. D.)).
50. See Sandra J. Tanenbaum, Medicaid Eligibility Policy in the 1980s: Medical
Utilitarianism and the “Deserving” Poor, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 933, 935 (1995).
51. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 57 (The Free Press 1974)); Tanenbaum, supra note 50, at 935.
52. See Tanenbaum, supra note 50, at 937-39; Thomas M. Selden et al., Medicaid’s Problem
Children: Eligible But Not Enrolled, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1998, at 192-93.
53. Tanenbaum, supra note 50, at 937-38; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND
ANALYSIS (A 1993 UPDATE) 3 (Comm. Print 1993).
54. See Louise G. Trubeck, The Health Care Puzzle: Creating Coverage for Low-Wage
Workers and Their Families, in HARD LABOR, supra note 25, at 143, 146-47. (“Over the past
decade, the expansion of Medicaid to cover non-AFDC families has broken the exclusive
eligibility link to AFDC.”).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The waivers are referred to as “§ 1115”
waivers (rather than “§ 1315” waivers because Congress created the authorization for the waiver
as § 1115 to Title XI of the Social Security Act. Section 1115 waivers are granted “in the case of
any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which . . . is likely to assist in promoting the
objectives of” the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a), and are employed by states to avoid
the rigors of Medicaid’s federal requirements in order to expand the population of persons
eligible for Medicaid (and thereby permitting states to receive federal matching funds while
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Medicaid eligibility to the working poor.57 The details of these waiver
programs vary from state to state. In the waiver programs, states couple costsaving elements with eligibility expansion. For example, states impose
restrictions in the choice of a health care provider or mandate enrollment in a
managed care program, and simultaneously expand eligibility criteria, in order
to stretch Medicaid dollars to cover more people.58
A second indication of a broadening scope of coverage for public programs
was the creation of CHIP. Confronted with the reality that over ten million
children were without health coverage of any kind, Congress created CHIP as a
part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, allocating over $20 billion in federal
matching funds for the program’s first five years.59 CHIP reaches children
with a family income above that reached by Medicaid, targeting children with
family income fifty percent above the limit for Medicaid coverage.60 CHIP’s
federal financing is through block grants, and it creates no entitlement to
coverage.61 Its funding and eligibility limitations will likely limit the extent to
which CHIP will cover those uninsured children; the Congressional Budget
Office has estimated that it will cover about 2.8 million in all.62 In theory,
CHIP permits § 1115 waivers to use federal funding to extend coverage to
families; however, Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”) has
exceeding federal limits on financial and categorical eligibility) and to move parts of their
Medicaid populations from fee for service to mandatory managed care systems. See PHYSICIAN
PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 422-24 (1997).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b),(c) (1994). The waivers are referred to as “§ 1915” waivers
(rather than “§ 1396n” waivers because Congress created the authorization for the waiver as §
1915 to Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The waivers permit states to avoid the rigors of
Medicaid’s federal requirements for pilot or experimental programs in more narrowly constrained
areas than those within the ambit of § 1115 waivers.
57. States have also been motivated in pursuing § 1115 and § 1915 waivers of payment and
eligibility principles by a desire to regularize and restrain costs. See John V. Jacobi, Mission and
Markets in Health Care: Protecting Essential Community Providers for the Poor, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1431, 1443-47 (1997); Colleen M. Grogan, The Medicaid Managed Care Policy Consensus
for Welfare Recipients: A Reflection of Traditional Welfare Concerns, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 815, 818-19 (1997); Suzanne Rotwein et al., Medicaid and State Health Care Reform:
Process, Programs, and Policy Options, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 105, 120 (1995).
58. See Ben Wheatley, State Approaches to Expanding Family Coverage, 4-5 (State
Coverage Initiatives Issue Brief, May 2000); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, supra
note 55, at 422-24.
59. Sara Rosenbaum et al., The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s Health Insurance
Program, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 76.
60. This understates the expansion of coverage for some children. The actual income limit is
the greater of fifty percent higher than the “medicaid applicable income level,” 42 U.S.C. §
1397jj(b)(1)(B)(ii)(I), or 200% of the poverty level. 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV.
1998).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See Neal Halfon et al., Challenges
in Securing Access to Care for Children, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 49.
62. See Rosenbaum, supra note 59, at 76.
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discouraged these waivers until the programs achieve greater experience with
the core task of covering children.63
A third instance suggesting the broadening use of public programs to cover
the working poor is the provision of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996 (“PRWOA”),64 by which Medicaid eligibility was
extended for a period of up to twelve months65 for families losing eligibility as
a result of employment.66 This provision provided, at least in theory, a bridge
for families on cash assistance, allowing them to maintain the security of
health coverage through Medicaid as they moved from welfare to work. By
permitting state Medicaid offices to “disregard” some portion of family income
and assets when determining eligibility, PRWOA creates the potential for
substantial future expansion of Medicaid to working families.67 Thus,
Medicaid was again uncoupled from welfare, further emphasizing that
Medicaid had become a “health insurance program for low-income families.”68
In the absence of more comprehensive reforms to provide coverage for the
working poor, expansions of public programs are likely to form at least a
substantial basis for future efforts to reduce the rate of uninsurance.69 Several
63. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM: STATE
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES ARE EVOLVING 10-11 (1999) (“Although title XXI provides the
opportunity for section 1115 waivers of title XXI requirements, HCFA will not consider such
waivers unless a state’s CHIP program has (1) been operational for at least 1 year and (2)
completed an evaluation. HCFA’s position reflects its belief that it is reasonable for the states to
have experience in operating their new title XXI programs before designing and submitting
demonstration proposals.”).
64. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §
1396u-1(c)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
65. In addition, nine states have received federal waivers permitting them to extend
Medicaid eligibility beyond the twelve month period. See Families USA, Losing Health
Insurance: The Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform (1999), at http://www.familiesusa.
org/uninten.htm [hereinafter Losing Health Insurance].
66. 42 U.S.C. §1396r-6(a) (1994).
67. See Wheatley, supra note 58, at 2-3.
68. Families USA, Go Directly to Work, Do Not Collect Health Insurance: Low-Income
Parents Lose Medicaid (2000), at http://www.familiesusa.org/pubs/gowrk.htm (n.d.) [hereinafter
Go Directly to Work].
69. To clarify, future incremental reforms are likely to expand eligibility for public
programs. Recent welfare reform efforts, including the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, have apparently failed in their intended purpose to
extend Medicaid eligibility to families as they moved from cash assistance welfare programs. See
Go Directly To Work, supra note 68, at 22; BOWEN GARRETT & JOHN HOLAHAN, THE URBAN
INSTITUTE, WELFARE LEAVERS, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 4
(2000); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN
SERVICES DIVISION, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT: AMID DECLINES, STATE EFFORTS TO ENSURE
COVERAGE AFTER WELFARE REFORM VARY 33-34 (1999); Losing Health Insurance, supra note
65, at 2. In addition, states have been slow to enroll eligible children in the CHIP program. See
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Senators have recently proposed the Family Care Act, which would provide
funding to extend public insurance coverage to the parents of children
participating in either Medicaid or CHIP.70 Presidential candidate Al Gore
proposed that CHIP eligibility be expanded from its current basic limit of
200% of poverty to 250% of poverty, and that children with family incomes
above 250% of poverty be permitted to buy into the CHIP program, taking
advantage of its presumably lower premium levels.71 In addition, he would
“expand CHIP to parents,” permitting working poor families to maintain
coverage through the same public program.72 Candidate George W. Bush,
while advocating market-oriented steps to reduce uninsurance, advocated
modifications to the CHIP program, giving states “the freedom to innovate and
expand coverage of the uninsured.”73 Current public officials, including New
York Governor George E. Pataki74 and New York City Mayor Rudolph W.
Giuliani75 both formerly hostile to expansion of public health programs, have
recently advocated expansions of public coverage.76

Robert Pear, Many States Slow to Use Children’s Insurance Fund, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, at
A1. The enrollments of children in CHIP have only balanced the attrition in children’s
enrollment in Medicaid, leaving no net gain in children’s coverage by public insurance. See
FAMILIES USA, ONE STEP BACK 1 (1999) [hereinafter ONE STEP BACK]. The reasons for states’
failure to enroll families in these expanded programs, while an issue of great moment, are beyond
the scope of this Article.
70. See Kennedy Backs Insurance Act For Parents, HOUS. CHRONICLE, July 23, 2000, at 15,
available in 2000 WL 24498805.
71. Al Gore Unveils Agenda to Improve Health Care for America’s Families, supra note 47.
72. Id.
73. On the Issues: Helping Individuals and Small Businesses Purchase Health Insurance,
supra note 47.
74. See Jennifer Steinhauser, For Giuliani and Pataki, About-Face on Health Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2000, at B1 (“Gov. George E. Pataki, who from the moment he took office has
sought to hack away the state’s Medicaid budget, recently championed far-reaching legislation to
help vast numbers of the state’s uninsured population get coverage at the government’s
expense.”).
75. See id. (“Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, whose administration until very recently made
concerted efforts to dissuade people from seeking Medicaid, the government insurance program
for the poor, last week announced an aggressive effort to find these very people and help them get
signed up.”) (emphasis in original).
76. Private organizations have also weighed in on public program expansion. As part of its
“Campaign for Coverage,” the American Hospital Association advocates expansion of CHIP and
Medicaid to groups of the poor and working poor now ineligible for the programs. See American
Hospital Association, Incremental Solutions for Improving and Increasing Health Care Coverage
for the Uninsured (1999), at http://www.aha.org/about/campaign/1299uninsuredsoln.html; Robert
Pear, Insurers Ask Government to Extend Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at A16
(reporting that the Health Insurance Association of America, a trade association of many of
America’s health insurance firms, advocates expansion of the CHIP program to cover persons of
all ages up to the poverty level, and the creation of a voucher program to expand coverage for
those with family incomes between 100% and 200% of the poverty level).
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If this emerging political mood in favor of public program expansions
takes root, the architects of expansion will face many challenges, both political
and technical. One of the looming technical problems is crowd-out, the
phenomenon associated with expansions in public coverage and the concurrent
reduction in private coverage in the target eligibility group. The nature and
extent of crowd-out is the topic of the next section.
II. THE INCIDENCE OF CROWD-OUT
A.

Crowd-Out in Medicaid

Medicaid’s original target population—the destitute—had very little access
to health coverage.77 As Medicaid expansions reached the working poor, with
incomes slightly above the poverty level, it extended coverage to populations
with greater, although still modest, access to employment-based coverage. In
1997, only 21.6% of adults with family incomes below the poverty level were
covered by employer-provided coverage, while 46.9% with family incomes
between 100% and 200% of the poverty level had employment-based
coverage.78 As the income line between public and private coverage was
blurred, researchers became interested in the intermeshing dynamics of the two
systems. In particular, they wondered about the extent to which Medicaid
expansions covered the previously uninsured, as opposed to simply displacing
private coverage.79
The interest in crowd-out springs from the coincidence of two trends in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. As Medicaid eligibility expanded and enrollment
increased,80 the rate of private coverage fell, particularly among the working
poor, and in similar numbers.81 The “essential policy question” posed by this
coincidence was: “Did the Medicaid expansions cause the private coverage
77. Most of the truly destitute, of course, have no family connection to employment (and
therefore no access to employment-based coverage), and no means to purchase coverage on their
own. In addition, workers in near-minimum-wage jobs are unlikely to be offered insurance
coverage. See O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 4.
78. See HOLAHAN & BRENNAN, supra note 16. In contrast to both the poor and the nearpoor, fully 86.3% of adults with family income above 300% of the poverty level enjoyed
employer-sponsored coverage. Id.
79. Described more completely, “[c]rowd-out is a term that covers two potential unintended
consequences of the Medicaid eligibility expansion: (1) persons with private coverage drop it in
order to take advantage of the public subsidy being offered; and (2) some who are uninsured
enroll in Medicaid rather than obtain private coverage (as they would have under the more
stringent Medicaid eligibility conditions).” Linda J. Blumberg et al., Did the Medicaid
Expansions for Children Displace Private Insurance? 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 33, 34 (2000).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
81. See Lara Shore-Sheppard et al., Medicaid and Crowding Out of Private Insurance: A ReExamination Using Firm Level Data, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 61, 63 (2000). See also supra text
accompanying notes 26-33.
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declines, or were the two contemporaneous trends independent?”82
Researchers thought this question significant because crowd-out diverts public
expenditures from their “intended” beneficiaries, thus reducing the efficiency
of the expansions.83 More subtly, crowd-out “may lead to fewer improvements
in access to care,” as funds that are expended to shift coverage rather than
provide new coverage presumably have a less significant affect on the health
status of those enrolled.84
Researchers have employed many methods in attempting to determine the
extent to which Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted
in the displacement of private coverage.85 Some of the researchers examined
cross-sections of aggregate population data (usually from the Current
Population Survey) to address the issue.86 These researchers observed the
change in insurance status in the eligible population, and adjusted for the
effects of other factors (for example, a recession in the economy during the
study period) to isolate only the substitution effect attributable to Medicaid
expansion.87 The reported results of these studies were not terribly consistent,
with estimates of crowd-out ranging from about fifteen percent to about fortyone percent.88 It appears that difficulties in correcting changes in insurance
status unrelated to Medicaid prevent more precise results from research using
cross-sections of population samples.89
82. Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 35.
83. See Esel Y. Yazici & Robert Kaestner, Medicaid Expansions and the Crowding Out of
Private Health Insurance Among Children, 37 INQUIRY 23, 23 (2000) (“The extent of crowd out
is an important public policy issue because it reduces the effectiveness of government
expenditures. Every dollar that unintentionally goes toward subsidizing previously insured
children becomes unavailable for use in reducing the number of uninsured, the intended target
group of the Medicaid expansions.”); Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 34 (“Crowd-out may . . .
lead to greater increases in Medicaid expenditures than expected as individuals who previously
had private insurance drop it to enroll in the subsidized public program.”).
84. See Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 34. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13
(discussing health-status effect of insurance coverage).
85. Detailed analysis of these studies is beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent
comparative analysis, see Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83 at 24-26; LISA DUBAY, THE KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION PROJECT ON INCREMENTAL HEALTH REFORM, EXPANSIONS IN PUBLIC
HEALTH INSURANCE AND CROWD-OUT: WHAT THE EVIDENCE SAYS (1999), available at
http://www.kff.org/content/1999/19991112m (n.d.).
86. See DUBAY, supra note 85, at 5.
87. See Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 24-25 (discussing D.M. Cutler & J. Gruber,
Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?, 111 Q. J. ECON. 391 (1996)); L. D. ShoreSheppard, Stemming the Tide? The Effect of Expanding Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance
Coverage (Unpublished paper, 1996); L. Dubay and G. Kenney, The Effects of Medicaid
Expansions on Insurance Coverage of Children, 6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 152 (1996). See
also DUBAY, supra note 85, at 5-9 (discussing studies of Cutler & Gruber and Dubay & Kenney).
88. See Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 24-25; DUBAY, supra note 85, at 5-9.
89. See Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 25 (“Our review of the crowd-out literature that
uses CPS data has highlighted two points. First, these studies have not reached a consensus on
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Another more recent set of studies has produced more homogeneous
results. Unlike the cross-sectional studies which examine large swaths of data
for two time periods and attempt to discern trends from shifts within a large
population, these studies follow a population over a period of time, and discern
trends by observing actual shifts in status of the members of the studied
population.90 The advantages of the more direct observations available
through longitudinal studies have been described by one of the researchers:
While cross-sectional data can be used to analyze the impacts of the Medicaid
expansions, longitudinal data can identify more complex effects of policy
changes. By following individuals over time, movements from one type of
coverage to another can be observed. To illustrate why this is important,
consider the following example: When cross-sectional data are used, the
movement of one group out of employer-sponsored coverage and into
uninsurance combined with another group moving from uninsurance to
Medicaid might be wrongly construed to be movement from employer
coverage into Medicaid. Such a characterization of these more complicated
dynamics would be misleading. To avoid this result, some researchers have
used longitudinal data.91

Cross-sectional studies could then read a simultaneous drop in the rate of
employer-sponsored coverage and increase in Medicaid enrollment as due to
crowd–out.92 Longitudinal analysis might demonstrate that the gross data
mask two different trends—the movement of one group of people from
employer-sponsored coverage to uninsurance, and a separate and unrelated
group from uninsurance to Medicaid. The second set of circumstances does
not describe the displacement of private coverage by a public program.
The longitudinal studies are not without their methodological problems.
Researchers do not have the opportunity to interview the test subjects, and
therefore must infer the effect of Medicaid expansion on the subjects’ change

the extent of crowd-out. Second, measurement error associated with Medicaid eligibility and a
lack of appropriate controls for state and time variation in insurance status may have confounded
estimates of crowd out.”); DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9 (“The inconsistency of the results from
[two of the CPS cross-sectional studies] is either due to differences in their overall methods or in
the comparison group used to account for the secular trends. Notably, each set of authors has
criticized the other for their choice of comparison groups.”) (footnote omittted).
90. See Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 38; Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 25, 30-31
(discussing their own results from a longitudinal study, as well as K. E. Thorpe and C. S.
Florence, Health Insurance Among Children: The Role of Expanded Medicaid Coverage, 35
INQUIRY 369 (1998) and an unpublished study of L. J. Blumberg, L. Dubay and S. Norton
(1999)); DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9-12 (discussing several studies by the same authors).
91. DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9.
92. Researchers using cross-sectional methods are, of course, aware of this problem, and use
a number of methods, including regression analysis, to attempt to correct for it. See id. at 6-8;
Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 24-25. Longitudinal analysis has the virtue of at least
attempting to get at this information directly.
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in coverage status by comparison to a control group.93 Researchers’ choice of
control groups against whom to compare the test group’s behavior has not been
without controversy.94 In addition, “sample sizes for the populations affected
by Medicaid programs are small in longitudinal surveys compared to crosssectional surveys such as the CPS potentially resulting in imprecise
estimates.”95
The longitudinal studies have produced results similar enough to each
other to give rise to some suggestion of validity. The range of results for
crowd-out from Medicaid expansions during the late 1980s and early 1990s
from these studies is generally from about fourteen percent to twenty percent.96
In a recently-published study, Yazici and Kaesnter reported results from an
examination of a large set of data on children surveyed in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth.97 The authors reported crowd-out of 18.9% for
a weighted average of subpopulations studied.98 Another recent study of
Medicaid expansion in the early 1990s shows an even smaller number.
Blumberg, Dubay and Norton reported this year that about twenty-three
percent of the movement from private insurance to expanded Medicaid during
that time period constituted crowd-out.99 That is, twenty-three percent of those
moving to expanded Medicaid from private coverage would otherwise have
continued private coverage, while the other seventy-seven percent would have
been uninsured due to job loss or other reasons unrelated to Medicaid.100 The
authors found that no significant percentage of those who moved from
uninsurance to expanded Medicaid would have had coverage absent Medicaid
expansion.101 The weighted averaging of those two groups results in a total
crowd-out rate of four percent.102
The convergence of the findings in the longitudinal studies permits
tentative conclusions as to the rate of crowd-out from Medicaid expansion
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This rate seems quite low, permitting a
finding that at least four out of five of those covered by those Medicaid
expansions would otherwise have been uninsured. One study concluded:
The consistency of recent findings that use a variety of methods and data
sources strongly suggests that the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and
early 1990s did not cause, in a substantial way, employers to cease to offer

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9.
See id.; Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 26.
DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9.
See id. at 14-15 (gathering results of longitudinal studies in chart form).
Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 27.
Id. at 30.
Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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private health insurance, nor did it cause families to drop private health
insurance. Instead, the results suggest that the expansion of Medicaid
effectively stemmed the tide . . . of an ongoing deterioration of private health
coverage among low-income children. In the absence of expanded Medicaid
coverage, the number of uninsured children would have been significantly
greater.103

The next section moves to CHIP, Medicaid’s sister program.
B.

Crowd-Out in CHIP

The CHIP program extends public insurance for children beyond the
eligibility limits for Medicaid. It targets near-poor children—those overincome for Medicaid,104 but whose family income does not exceed the greater
of fifty percent above the state’s Medicaid income level, or 200% of the
poverty level.105 Studies (some undertaken after the passage of the CHIP
legislation) have suggested that crowd-out may be more likely to appear as
public programs reach relatively higher-income individuals.106 Apparently
reflecting this concern, Congress structured CHIP so as to reduce the
likelihood of crowd-out, and to mandate the study of steps taken by states to
minimize crowd-out.
The legislation creating CHIP, and a draft of implementing regulations,
evidence legislative and administrative concern that the new public program
not displace private coverage. The draft regulations highlight this concern:
One of the fundamental principles of title XXI is that CHIP coverages should
not supplant existing private coverage. Title XXI contains provisions
specifically designed to ensure that States use CHIP funds to provide coverage
only to uninsured children. These provisions maximize the use of Federal

103. Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 30-31.
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(b)(1)(B), (C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining “targeted lowincome child” for purposes of CHIP eligibility as being ineligible for Medicaid).
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining “low-income child” as
one whose family income does not exceed 200% of the poverty level); 42 U.S.C. §
1397jj(b)(1)(B) (describing CHIP eligibility standard as met by either meeting the “low-income
definition” or living in a family with income that does not exceed the state Medicaid eligibility
limit by more than fifty percent).
106. See Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 58 (“[T]he fiscal implications of crowd-out under
the CHIP program are likely to be greater than under the Medicaid expansions. This is because
children eligible for CHIP will, by definition, have higher family incomes than children eligible
for Medicaid expansion in their state.”); Lisa Dubay & Genevieve Kenney, Did Medicaid
Expansion for Pregnant Women Crowd Out Private Coverage?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at
191 (“[E]xtending Medicaid coverage up to the federal poverty level is likely to involve very little
crowding out and to greatly reduce the number without insurance. However, extending Medicaid
coverage above the poverty level may well lead to crowding out, given the greater extent of
employer-sponsored coverage of the near-poor and the untenable financial burden these families
may face to retain such coverage.”).
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dollars. Specifically, title XXI requires that States ensure that coverage
provided under CHIP does not substitute for coverage under either private
group health plans or Medicaid.107

State plans implementing CHIP programs must contain “a description of
procedures to be used to ensure . . . that insurance provided under the State
child health plan does not substitute for coverage under group plans.”108
Many states had developed some experience in creating programmatic
barriers to crowd-out through their implementation of pre-CHIP state insurance
expansion programs.109 These programs have been funded by states, and
states’ concerns with crowd-out are therefore internally driven.110 Some of the
mechanisms were aimed at lessening the incentives for individuals to drop (or
fail to take up) private coverage in favor of public coverage. The most
straight-forward mechanisms erect “firewalls”111 between public and private
coverage by denying access to the public programs to either those with access
to employment-based coverage with minimal employee contribution
requirements or those who have been insured within a three or six month
period.112 States have used these eligibility requirements as a direct means to
limit public program access to the uninsured.113
Other mechanisms seem less applicable to CHIP. For example, some
states have created plans that omit coverage of inpatient care.114 While this

107. State Child Health; Implementing Regulations for the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 60882, 60921 (Nov. 8, 1999). This Article is concerned with the
relationship between public and private coverage and issues relating to the substitution of CHIP
coverage for Medicaid coverage are, therefore, beyond its scope.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(b)(3)(C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See 64 Fed. Reg. 60882, 60958
(Nov. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 457.805) (“The State plan must include a description
of reasonable procedures to ensure that coverage provided under the plan does not substitute for
coverage under group health plans . . . . “). One means by which states may expend their allotted
CHIP funds is to purchase private health coverage of an eligible child and her family, so long as
such purchase is “cost effective relative” to direct coverage by a public program. 42 U.S.C. §
1397ee(c)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). A state may not use CHIP funds for such purposes of
the purchase of coverage by the state “if it would otherwise substitute for health coverage that
would be provided to such children but for the purchase of family coverage.” 42 U.S.C. §
1397ee(c)(3)(B). See 64 Fed. Reg. 60882, 60958 (proposed Nov. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. § 457.810) (crowd-out provisions for state plans purchasing private coverage).
109. See Anna Fallieras et al., Examining Substitution: State Strategies to Limit “Crowd Out”
in the Era of Children’s Health Insurance Expansions (Dec. 9, 1997), at http://aspe.hhs.
gov/health/reports/hinsubst/front.htm. See also Trish Riley, Can We Count on the States to Cover
the Poor and Uninsured?, in THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 10, at
276-77 (discussing state-funded insurance expansion programs).
110. See Riley, supra note 109, at 276-77.
111. See Fallieras, supra note 109, at Part IV.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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step would certainly give a low-wage worker pause before dropping workplace
coverage in favor of the public plan, such a program design seems to interfere
with the goal of providing meaningful health coverage—it simply leaves out
too much that is essential. In any event, states’ CHIP plans must provide full
access to care, including inpatient care.115
Another tool used to discourage employees from dropping private
coverage is the use of high levels of cost-sharing.116 States have set premiums
and copayment amounts to approximate or exceed those imposed in
employment-based coverage, reasoning that employees would therefore
perceive no benefit in shifting from private to public coverage.117 CHIP
programs are limited in their use of such tools, however.118 In addition, were
CHIP to permit states to impose large cost sharing on working poor families,
such cost-shifting may limit program participation by families with no access
to private coverage. As is described above, high levels of cost sharing in
private insurance is one of the main causes of low take-up in employmentbased coverage.119
Other mechanisms are used in the state-only expansions to limit employer
behavior, and specifically to address employers’ incentives to drop employee
coverage in favor of their employees’ enrollment in the new public program.
These mechanisms directly co-opt employers by offering them direct and
indirect subsidies for providing workplace coverage.120 States have engaged in
more talk than action in this regard, in part for budgetary reasons and in part
because this mechanism, depending on its details, actually encourages
substitution.121 In any event, such subsidy to employers is not a meaningful
part of the CHIP program.122
The Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”) circulated a letter to
the states on crowd-out shortly after CHIP’s enactment.123 The letter reminded

115. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). State CHIP plans must
include inpatient and outpatient hospital care.
116. See Fallieras et al., supra note 109, at Part IV.
117. Id.
118. States may not impose cost-sharing for children with family income below 150% of
poverty, beyond those minimal amounts permitted by Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(e)(3)(A)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For higher-income children, states may impose greater cost-sharing,
but the total out-of-pocket expense for all of a family’s eligible children is limited to five percent
of the family’s yearly income. 42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(e)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41 (describing high employee cost-sharing as one
of the main causes of the erosion of employment-based coverage for low-income workers).
120. See Fallieras et al., supra note 109, at Part IV.
121. Id.
122. But see 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (permitting purchase with
CHIP funds of private group coverage under limited circumstances).
123. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations &
Claude Earl Fox, Acting Administrator, Health Resources and Services Administration, to State
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states that “[t]he new law contains provisions explicitly designed to ensure that
funds are targeted only to uninsured, and not already insured, children.”124 It
advised that HCFA would review state plans “to determine if the State has
included procedures designed to address any potential substitution
concerns.”125 HCFA review was vaguely described for CHIP plans providing
coverage directly to children, and the letter indicated that HCFA reserves the
right to require modification of state plans should history demonstrate that
initial anti-substitution procedures were ineffective.126 More detailed advice
was given for anti-substitution measures in plans proposing the use of CHIP
funds to subsidize private insurance.127
The principal mechanism selected by states to meet this challenge has been
a requirement that applicants be uninsured for a period of three or six months
before applying for CHIP coverage.128 Data gathered by the National
Governors Association shows that of the twenty-nine CHIP plans which
provide coverage at least in part through non-Medicaid CHIP plans,129 twentyfive seek to prevent crowd-out by imposing waiting periods—intervals during
which the child was not covered by insurance.130 Of those twenty-five states,
Health Officials, (Feb. 13, 1998), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/chsub213.htm
[hereinafter Letter to State Health Officials].
124. Id. at 1.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id.
128. The HCFA website provides information on all approved state plans. See The Health
Care Financing Administration, State Children’s Health Insurance Program Approved Plan
Files, at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/chpa-map.htm (last visited July 5, 2000). In addition, the
National Governors Association (“NGA”) has produced a report providing detailed information
on state plans and amendments. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, STATE CHILDREN’S
HEALTH INSURANCE: ANNUAL REPORT (1999), available at http://www.nga.org/MCH/Annual/
Index.asp [hereinafter NGA ANNUAL REPORT]. The crowd-out provisions discussed in the text
apply to programs extending coverage through separate CHIP programs that reach beyond
Medicaid eligibility. See The Health Care Financing Administration, New Jersey Title XXI State
Plan and Amendment Summary, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/int/chnjfact.htm (last visited
July 17, 2000); The Health Care Financing Administration, Delaware Title XXI State Plan
Summary, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/int/chpfsde.htm (last visited July 17, 2000).
129. That is, plans that extend eligibility through CHIP-specific plans that are distinct from
Medicaid expansion plans.
130. See NGA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 128, at tbl.15. Alternatively or in addition, some
states attempt to prevent substitution by checking independent sources for applicant’s insurance
and/or employment history. See id. All NGA Fact Sheets are available at www.nga.org. NGA
Fact Sheet on Mississippi plan (“The eligibility process incorporates the investigation of
creditable health coverage using data matches and client interviews. . . .”); NGA Fact Sheet on
Georgia plan (“Employer information also is validated by checks of wage record data with the
Georgia Department of Labor when available.”); NGA Fact Sheet on Alabama plan (state is
developing “AL Health Care Information Network, which will operate a master patient index of
current coverage of Alabama citizens” in order to identify children eligible for private coverage).
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twenty-two permit the waiting period to be waived under some
circumstances,131 invariably for circumstances judged to be beyond the control
of the applicant or family.132
The CHIP statute requires that states gather certain data, file compliance
reports and cooperate with federal studies of the CHIP program.133 Each state
was required to submit a comprehensive evaluation of its program by March
31, 2000.134 The states were specifically required to address the issue of
crowd-out.135 The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services,
in turn, is required to file with Congress, by December 31, 2001, “a report
based on the evaluations submitted by the States . . ., containing any
conclusions and recommendations the Secretary considers appropriate.”136 As

131. Id.
132. See id., NGA Fact Sheet on New Jersey plan (six month waiting period waived if
“insurance is lost through no fault to the family, such as a layoff”); NGA Fact Sheet on Nevada
plan (six month waiting period waived if family lost insurance “due to circumstances beyond
their control”); NGA Fact Sheet on Alabama plan (three month waiting period applies only to
those who “voluntarily drop private insurance coverage”); NGA Fact Sheet for Montana plan
(three month waiting period is waived if parent providing coverage is “fired, laid off, becomes
disabled, has a lapse in insurance coverage after starting a new job, or the employer discontinues
coverage”); NGA Fact Sheet for Vermont plan (one month waiting period is waived if loss of
insurance coverage is without “good cause”); NGA Fact Sheet on Wyoming plan (one month
waiting period is waived if parent providing coverage is “laid off, fired, can no longer work due
to a disability, or has a lapse in insurance coverage because he/she obtains new employment”).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1397gg(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
135. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397hh(b)(1)(B)(i), (b)(1)(D) (requiring the report to describe the
insurance coverage and access status of participating children prior to their CHIP enrollment, and
requiring the report to describe state activities to coordinate activities of the state plan with other
private and public sources of coverage). State plans often included studies and evaluations
among the mechanisms for addressing the problem of substitution, perhaps in recognition of the
uncertainty surrounding the issue. See NGA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 128, at tbl.15. See
also, The Health Care Financing Administration, Florida Title XXI Program Fact Sheet,
available at http://www.hcfa.gov/ init/chpfsfl.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (“The State will
study the Health Kid’s program’s impact on crowd out.”); The Health Care Financing
Administration, Washington Title XXI Program Fact Sheet, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/
init/chpfswa.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (the state “will conduct periodic surveys of all CHIP
households to determine if they had dependent coverage prior to enrollment.”); The Health Care
Financing Administration, Wyoming Title XXI Program Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.hcfa.gov/init/chpfswy.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (“Wyoming will also monitor
to determine if crowd-out is a problem. If the results of monitoring indicate crowd-out is
occurring, the state will develop and implement strategies to prevent crowd-out.”).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(b)(2). The Secretary has contracted with Mathematica Policy
Research “to prepare background information for the Report to Congress, including a synthesis of
State annual reports, State evaluations, and statistical data; a review of external studies of SCHIP;
and an assessment of SCHIP in important areas such as outreach and enrollment, as well as
access to, and quality of, health coverage.”
See THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING
ADMINISTRATION, SCHIP ANNUAL ENROLLMENT REPORT (FISCAL YEAR 1999) 6-7 (2000),
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is described in the following section, the extent of crowd-out in CHIP is not
clear, although the short-term and long-term implications for the eventual
production of this information are quite significant.
III. THE FUTURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF CROWD-OUT
A.

Interest in Crowd-Out: An Interlude

The interest in the problems of crowd-out perhaps understandably waxed
at the time of the creation of the CHIP program. The early studies of prior
expansions of Medicaid had produced mixed results, which could give rise to
concerns that a powerful extension of public insurance above the ranks of the
truly destitute would produce as much displacement of private insurance as
coverage of the uninsured.137 Interest had waned two years later. In the
Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999,138
Congress ordered additional studies related to CHIP, but the emphasis had
shifted from concern over the displacement of private insurance to the dual
concern that states were failing to enroll children in their plans,139 and that
those enrolled may have been eligible for Medicaid, a pre-existing program140

available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/children.htm [hereinafter 1999 CHIP ANNUAL REPORT]. In
1999, Congress instructed the Secretary to file an additional report on the same day. See 42
U.S.C. § 1397hh(c) (Supp. III 1997), added by the Balanced Budget Refinement Act, Pub. L. No.
106-113, § 703(b), 113 Stat. 1537-314, 394. That report, the product of “an independent
evaluation of 10 States with approved child health plans,” is to focus on the flip side of the
crowd-out problem—the problem of the CHIP program reaching too few eligible children. See
42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(c)(3) (describing the matters to be included in the ten-state survey report as
supplementing the information provided in the report required by 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(b)(2)).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
138. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1537-314 (1999).
139. See Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 703(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(c) (Supp. III 1997))
(requiring federal assessment of state efforts in enrollment, including “[e]valuation of effective
and ineffective outreach and enrollment practices with respect to children . . ., identification of
enrollment barriers,” “[a]n assessment of the effect of cost-sharing on utilization, enrollment, and
coverage retention,” and “[e]valuation of disenrollment or other retention issues.”); Id. § 703(d)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(d) (Supp. III. 1997)) (requiring Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services to audit, and requiring the GAO to review and report
on the Inspector General’s audit, states’ “progress made in reducing the number of uncovered
children, including the progress made to achieve the strategic objectives an performance goals
included in the” state’s CHIP plan).
140. See id. § 703(c) (requiring federal evaluation of “the extent to which coordination (or
lack of coordination) between [a state’s Medicaid] program and [its CHIP program] affects the
enrollment of children under both programs.”); Id. § 703(d) (requiring Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services to audit, and requiring the GAO to review and report
on the Inspector General’s audit for the number of Medicaid-eligible children enrolled in a state’s
CHIP program).
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for which the federal government pays a smaller share of cost than it does for
CHIP.141
The fact that CHIP would have enrollment problems should not have come
as a surprise, considering Medicaid, a well-established and familiar program,
had long struggled to reach millions of eligible but uninsured children.142
Within two years of its enactment, however, the dominant issue related to the
CHIP program was its disappointing growth rate. In 1999, a front-page article
in the New York Times opened with the following assessment:
States are using less than 20 percent of the Federal money that Congress made
available, with much fanfare, for a big new program to subsidize health
insurance for children in low-income families.
Some states say they cannot find enough eligible uninsured children to use
all of the money that they are entitled to receive. Critics say many states have
been slow to reach out to eligible children and sign them up.
The program’s slow start and the accumulation of unspent money are
tempting Republicans in Congress to take back some of the money and use it
for other purposes—an idea vehemently opposed by Democrats, by advocates
for children, and by governors of both parties.143

Demonstrating concern for the slow start-up of the CHIP program, both the
White House and HCFA announced initiatives to identify and enroll CHIPeligible children and to allocate funds to support those efforts.144 In testimony
141. See ONE STEP BACK, supra note 69, at 20-21 (attributing a simultaneous drop in
Medicaid coverage of children and increase in CHIP coverage of children in part to the fact that
“the federal government pays a larger share of the costs of CHIP”); Pear, supra note 69, at B22
(“But states have a strong financial incentive to put children into the new program, rather than in
Medicaid, because the Federal Government pays a larger share of the costs—65 percent, rather
than 50 percent, in high-income states like New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.”).
142. See Selden et al., supra note 52, at 196 (“4.7 million children aged eighteen and under
were uninsured [in 1996] despite being eligible for Medicaid, representing approximately two in
every five uninsured children in the United States.”) (footnote omitted).
143. Pear, supra note 69, at A1. Others also noted the slow pace of CHIP enrollment. An
Issue Paper published by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured stated:
The recent expansions of children’s health insurance programs at federal and state levels
offer an unprecedented opportunity to reach out and enroll millions of uninsured children
who now qualify for publicly subsidized health coverage. However, even with the
infusion of new money and resources to get this job done, states and localities have had
limited success reaching the millions of children who are currently eligible but not
enrolled for health care coverage.
DAWN HORNER ET AL., THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, EXPRESS
LANE ELIGIBILITY: HOW TO ENROLL LARGE GROUPS OF ELIGIBLE CHILDREN IN MEDICAID AND
CHIP (1999), available at http://www.kff.org/docs/sections/kcmu/current.html.
144. See Press Release: The Clinton-Gore Administration Takes New Steps to Increase
Enrollment of Uninsured Children (Oct. 12, 1999), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/
whchip12.htm (describing several initiatives to reach out to eligible children, and the funding of a
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before Congress in 1999, the HCFA Administrator spoke extensively about
outreach and did not mention any concern for the possible displacement of
private insurance.145 HCFA’s 1999 Annual CHIP Report to Congress follows
through on this emphasis, concentrating on identification, enrollment and
retention of eligible children.146
Perhaps reflecting the federal focus, states appear to have done little to
review their programs for crowd-out. No published source suggests that any of
the state reports filed earlier this year contained any systematic study on the
topic, no doubt reasonably concentrating instead on the federal government’s
more pressing concern of identification, enrollment, and retention of eligible
children. Informal surveys of state CHIP programs reflect a disinclination to
study crowd-out and, often, a disinclination to credit the possibility of its
existence in their programs. Most of the CHIP offices contacted had
performed no studies of crowd-out or believed that there was no displacement
of private coverage associated with their programs.147 The few states that had
conducted either formal or informal investigations of crowd-out found levels in
line with studies of crowd-out associated with previous Medicaid

$9 million project by the federal government and a private foundation to identify outreach
techniques); Press Release: Children’s Health Insurance Program National Back-To-School Kick
Off (Sept. 22, 1999), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/990922wh.htm (announcing
interagency effort to enroll children in CHIP, and announcing a “$1 million radio campaign,
funded by HHS, to promote . . . upcoming enrollment activities . . .”).
145. The Children’s Health Insurance Program: Testimony Before the Senate Finance
Committee (Apr. 29, 1999) (statement of Nancy-Ann DeParle, Administrator, Health Care
Financing Administration), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/testm429.htm.
146. See 1999 CHIP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 6. The Report makes only oblique
reference to crowd-out, mentioning that a component of states’ reports to HCFA is the enrolled
“children’s access to other health insurance coverage prior to and subsequent to their coverage
under the State SCHIP plan.” Id.
147. Telephone interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Gayle Sandlin, Director, CHIP,
Alabama Department of Public Health (May 22, 2000); Telephone interview by Alexander
Shekhdar with Joie Wallis, Program Administrator, Division of Medical Services, Arkansas
Department of Human Services (May 22, 2000); Telephone interview with Linda Mead, HUSKY
Plan Project Director, Department of Social Services, State of Connecticut (May 24, 2000);
Telephone interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Fran Ellington, Program Director, Medicaid
Eligibility and Quality Control, Department of Medical Assistance, State of Georgia (May 22,
2000); Telephone interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Diane Moore, Division Medicaid
Administration, Department of Health and Welfare, State of Idaho (May 26, 2000); Telephone
interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Susie Baird, Director of Programs, Bureau of TennCare,
Department of Health, State of Tennessee (May 24, 2000); E- mail from Jane Longo, Chief,
Bureau of KidCare, Illinois Department of Public Aid (May 24, 2000) (on file with the author);
E-mail from Ann Rugg, Managed Care Senior Administrator, Office of Vermont Health Access,
Department of Social Welfare, State of Vermont (May 23, 2000) (on file with the author); E-mail
from Dedrea McCoy, Department of Medicaid Services, Division of Children’s Health Programs,
State of Kentucky (May 24, 2000) (on file with the author).
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expansions.148 With respect to crowd-out and other areas of interest in the
CHIP program’s development, states appear to be too absorbed in the difficult
task of bringing a new program on-line to develop a great deal of data.149 No
national studies accompanied the passage of CHIP legislation, and it will be
difficult to examine the effects of CHIP after the fact.150 The study recently
commissioned by HCFA will therefore be of great significance.151
B.

The Implications of Renewed Interest in Crowd-Out

The expansion of public program eligibility into the ranks of the working
poor, occasioned by the shrinking private coverage of this group,152 will be
accompanied by some degree of displacement of private coverage. Prior
expansions resulted in some displacement of private coverage, although four
out of five of those enrolled would otherwise have been uninsured.153 At the
lower ends of the wage spectrum, many workers are uninsured, while many
others are not. For workers with family incomes below 200% of the poverty
level, the percentage of insured and uninsured workers is about even.154 As
expansions target near-poor working families, then, eligible persons will
increasingly have at least nominal access to private coverage.155 These
expansions, including CHIP programs, will therefore increasingly give rise to a
clash between the goals of providing coverage for the uninsured and limiting
public programs to those without access to private coverage.
The lack of recent attention by state and federal officials to crowd-out,
described above, suggests a danger of surprise and overreaction when some
148. Telephone interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Office of Children’s Health Programs,
Department of Health and Human Services, State of South Carolina (May 23, 2000) (South
Carolina estimates its crowd-out rate at approximately ten percent of enrollment); Telephone
interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Susan Moore, Bureau of Health Economics, Department
of Health, State of New York (May 26, 2000) (New York estimates that its “actual” crowd-out
rate is between four percent and six percent of enrollment); Facsimile from Chad Westover,
Administrator, Children’s Health Insurance Program, Department of Health, State of Utah (May
23, 2000) (on file with the author) (Of a survey of 201 applicants for Utah’s SCHIP program,
sixty-three applicants, or thirty-one percent, most recently had employer-sponsored health
insurance.); INSTITUTE FOR CHILD HEALTH POLICY, FLORIDA KIDCARE PROGRAM EVALUATION
REPORT xiii (2000), available at http://www.ichp.edu/FloridaKidCare/flaKC.htm (overall only
eleven percent of children had employer-based coverage prior to entering the KidCare Program).
149. See Halfon et al., supra note 61, at 58.
150. Id. at 56-58.
151. See 1999 CHIP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
153. See supra text accompanying note 103.
154. See supra text accompanying note 78.
155. That is, more people income-eligible for public programs will at least be offered private
coverage, although an increasing number of these income-eligible people will decline the offer
due to the high cost-sharing associated with the private coverage. See supra text accompanying
notes 39-41.
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degree of crowd-out is recognized. The antidotes to this overreaction are
awareness and perspective. The surprise that may accompany the recognition
of a moderate level of crowd-out in public program expansion is illustrated by
the recent experience of Rhode Island with its broad public expansion
program, RIte Care.
RIte Care began with the filing of an application for a § 1115 waiver in
July 1993.156 The program began accepting members on August 1, 1994, and
initially accepted families with children under age six and with incomes under
250% of the poverty level; the plan was expanded in 1996 and 1997 to cover
families with children up to age eighteen.157 Pursuant to a CHIP application
filed on January 5, 1998, RIte Care incorporated CHIP’s enhanced federal
matching payments for children who would not, absent the § 1115 waiver,
have been covered by Medicaid.158 The program included anti-displacement
provisions. Children eligible under the CHIP coverage must be uninsured, and
may not have refused or dropped, within the year prior to application,
employment-based coverage with an employee premium cost of less than $150
per month for individual coverage or $300 per month for family coverage.159
Through RIte Care, Rhode Island embarked on a plan to create “seamless
coverage” for low-income children and their families, combining a state
program, a § 1115 waiver increasing Medicaid eligibility and a CHIP
program.160 Through a Medicaid expansion program,161 adults were eligible
for public coverage with family incomes up to 185% of the poverty level.162
Pregnant women and children were eligible for coverage with family incomes
up to 250% of the poverty level.163 This RIte Care expansion succeeded in
identifying, enrolling and retaining families, and by May 2000 it covered

156. The Health Care Financing Administration, Rhode Island Statewide Health Reform
Demonstration Fact Sheet, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/rifact.htm (last visited Oct.
15, 2000).
157. Id. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-12.3-9 (1993).
158. See The Health Care Financing Administration, Rhode Island Title XXI State Plan Fact
Sheet, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/int/chpfsri.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000).
159. Id.
160. State Legislative Agendas Focus on Managed Care and Chip: Potential and Value of
Further State Reform Debated, 30 STATE INITIATIVES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM 7 (March
1999).
161. This expansion provided, beginning in 1999, coverage for adults with income up to
185% of the poverty level pursuant to a “§ 1931 income disregard.” See Wheatley, supra note
58, at 3. “Section 1931” refers to § 1931 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998).
162. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-16-1 (1999).
163. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-12.3-3, 3-4 (1993). The expanded program for children is
referred to in the legislation as “RIte Track.” For ease of reference, and consistent with popular
discourse, the program will be referred to generally as “RIte Care.”
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“101,600 low- and middle-income adults and children, about 10 percent of the
state’s population . . . .”164
As costs increased beyond budgeted levels,165 criticism of the program
centered on crowd-out. A recent editorial in a Rhode Island newspaper
captured this focus on private coverage displacement:
[RIte Care] has been wildly successful in bringing health coverage to Rhode
Island’s low- and moderate-income populations. But because of a sharp jump
in enrollments, RIte Care now accounts for more than half of the expected $50
million increase in state Department of Human Services spending . . . . It has
done wonderfully well in reducing the numbers of uninsured Rhode Islanders.
Only 10 percent of Rhode Islanders have no health insurance, compared with
18 percent nationally . . . . Where have the new beneficiaries come from?
Well, some 20,000 Rhode Islanders dumped their private coverage to sign up
for the free state plan.166

The level of crowd-out experienced by the program was reported in the press
as approximately twenty percent,167 a rate not jarringly out of line with the
rates estimated for Medicaid expansions with less generous eligibility levels.168
The press reports suggested a high level of concern that this level of crowd-out
was unexpected, and unexpectedly high.169 The press also cited the enrollment
of state employees (prohibited under state law) as a systemic problem,170
although this form of substitution accounted for only eight of over onehundred-thousand enrollees, and all had apparently been removed from the
program.171
Under these circumstances, Rhode Island officials could have reacted
favorably, concluding that the aggressive outreach undertaken to promote
164. Christopher Rowland, Officials Rethinking RIte Care’s Mission, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL.,
May 21, 2000, at A1.
165. Id. (“The Department of Human Services budget has a projected $50 million deficit in its
health-related programs; more than half of it is due to RIte Care overruns.”).
166. The RIte Care Crisis, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June 1, 2000, at B6.
167. Rowland, supra note 164, at A1 (reporting that “up to 20,000” of a total of 101,600
people covered by the program in 2000 “dumped private health insurance to take advantage of the
free state plan”).
168. See text accompanying notes 86-102.
169. See Rowland, supra note 164, at A1 (“Political leaders scrambling to control the state’s
budget-busting RIte Care health-insurance program have discovered a troubling trend: up to
20,000 Rhode Islanders have dumped private health insurance to take advantage of the free state
plan.”); The RIte Care Crisis, supra note 166, at B6 (“RIte Care now accounts for more than half
of the expected $50 million increase in the state Department of Human Services spending . . . .
Where have the new beneficiaries come from? Well, some 20,000 Rhode Islanders dumped their
private coverage to sign up for the free state plan.”).
170. See Rowland, supra note 164, at A1 (“There have even been a few isolated instances of
state employees signing up for RIte Care . . . .); The RIte Care crisis, supra note 166, at B6
(“State employees are not allowed to join RIte Care, but several have sneaked in.”).
171. See Rowland, supra note 164, at A1.
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public knowledge of the RIte Care program172 had succeeded in a way that
would make CHIP programs around the country envious.173 The fiscal
realities, of course, put the brakes on that reaction. The high enrollment in the
program, whether attributable to the success of the outreach program, increases
in the employee costs of coverage for low-income workers, or other factors
external to the RIte Care program,174 resulted in the public program’s coverage
of ten percent of the state’s population, with the program on the hook for twice
as much, should all those eligible apply.175
To its credit, Rhode Island did not react to the higher-than-expected cost of
the program by slashing it and reducing eligibility or services. The response,
however, highlights the importance of taking seriously the developments in
crowd-out in public program expansion. Rhode Island reacted to what was
cast in the public discourse as a crowd-out problem, quite predictably, with a
crowd-out solution. Initially, the state was determined to move quite
aggressively to limit displacement of private coverage. An early draft of the
amendatory statute, for example, would have barred access to RIte Care for
employees who refused or dropped coverage if the employer paid more than
fifty percent of the premium, even if the employee’s share of the premium
would have imposed a crushing burden on a low-income family.176 The Rhode
172. See id. (“The state undertook promotion efforts. The state Department of Human
Services won a grant, part of which was used to support the work of thirty-four outreach workers
around the state.”).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43 (discussing national concern over the slow
growth rate of CHIP programs).
174. See Rowland, supra note 164, at A1 (describing several factors that might have
contributed to high RIte Care enrollment, including outreach, the fact that “[e]mployers and
employees have faced double digit increases in health-care costs for three straight years . . .,” and
difficulties experienced by Rhode Island’s health insurance companies).
175. Id. (“Legislators are nervous about the potential for continued increases. By current
estimates, 196,000 could qualify to join RIte Care, nearly double the current number of clients.”).
176. See Felice J. Freyer & Christopher Rowland, State Leaders Unveil Plan They Say Will
Save RIte Care, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June 16, 2000, at A1. The article discussed other
restrictions for employees with some connection with workplace coverage:
The new legislation sets a waiting period for certain adults applying for RIte Care, and
places new restrictions on eligibility for RIte Care (and RIte Share [a proposed new
segment of the public program applicable to income eligible people with some access to
private coverage]). It would bar people whose premium costs are low or whose employer
pays 80 percent of the premium; people (with a few exceptions) who have refused or
dropped, within the previous six months, employer-sponsored health insurance in which
the employer pays more than 50 percent of the premium; and people whose employer
drops coverage for a class of employees who would qualify for RIte Care.
Additionally, RIte Care enrollees whose income is more than 150 percent of the federal
poverty level (about 10 percent of the current RIte Care population) would have to pay
some co-payments and premiums, on a scale based on income. But those costs could not
exceed 5 percent of an enrollee’s income.
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Island Director of Human Services suggested that this and other anti-crowd-out
provisions would result in the disqualification of about four-thousand thencurrent RIte Care participants, and would bar four-thousand people expected to
apply in the next year.177 Advocates expressed concern that the changes would
limit access to needed health coverage.178
The process leading to the passage of the amendatory statute softened this
hard edge. In adopting a “RIte Care Stabilization” Act,179 the General
Assembly reaffirmed its goal of “providing or creating access to affordable
health insurance for all Rhode Islanders who are uninsured.”180 It noted that
this commitment to full insurance was not to be interpreted as a turning away
from the traditional support of “coverage available through private employerbased health plans.”181 The legislation stands in contrast to press discussions
of the RIte Care budget problems, and the discussions of an early draft of the
amending language, which focused on people “dumping” private coverage and
“sneaking” into RIte Care eligibility. The introductory language of the
legislation sets forth a series of findings, which in no way blames the working
poor of Rhode Island for the program’s unexpectedly high costs. Instead, the
findings attribute the costs to “an erosion in access to affordable employerbased health-insurance coverage,”182 attributable to “escalating costs of private
health coverage . . . for small businesses,”183 and to “instability” in the state’s
market for health finance, evidenced by the loss of two major health
insurers.184 The legislature, in addition, found that the solution to RIte Care’s
budgetary woes will be addressed by attempting to shore up the private
employer-based insurance market.185
The legislation takes only two new steps to address crowd-out in RIte
Care. First, it conditions families’ participation in RIte Care on their
enrollment in any offered employer-based insurance plans,186 but creates a

Id.
177. Id. (citing Christine C. Ferguson).
178. Id. (citing Marti Rosenberg, of Rhode Island Health Care Organizing Project).
179. An Act Relating to Health Reform, R.I. 2000—RIte Care Stabilization, Small Employer
Insurance Reform, and Health Insurers’ Accountability, 2000 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 00-229
[hereinafter RIte Care Stabilization Act].
180. Id. § 1.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 1(1).
183. Id. § 1(3).
184. RIte Care Stabilization Act, supra note 179, § 1(2).
185. Id. § 1(4) - (6). The RIte Care Stabilization Act is predominantly concerned with small
group and individual market reform, devoting seventeen of the substantive sections to that task,
and only three sections to modifications to RIte Care itself.
186. Id. § 2 (adding new § 40-8.4-12(a) which directs the Department of Human Services to
achieve a plan amendment requiring “eligible individuals with access to employer-based health
insurance to enroll themselves and/or their family” in the insurance plan as a “condition of

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

110

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:79

premium support program which will pay some or all of the employee share of
such employment-based coverage.187 The second change was to permit the
Department of Human Services to adopt regulations subjecting to cost-sharing,
for the first time, a group of public program participants: those with family
income between 150% and 185% of poverty.188 The latter provision, however,
limits the contribution of the low-income family to three percent of income,
less than the five percent discussed in a draft version of the statute.189
In the process from the initial public splash about crowd-out in Rhode
Island to the passage of the legislation “stabilizing” RIte Care, the discourse
and language moved from knee-jerk to measured response. There are two
short-term lessons that can be drawn from Rhode Island’s experience. First,
pay attention to the issue of crowd-out. The issue is not an entirely simple one.
If the “discovery” that some modest percentage of public program participants
were eligible for some level of private coverage catches governmental officials
flat-footed, the press and those hostile to public insurance programs can be
expected to make out of the discovery some combination of skullduggery on
the part of low-income participants and incompetence on the part of the
program’s administrators. Rhode Island officials, it is safe to say, would have
preferred to act to create a private premium support component in RIte Care,
rather than react to assertions in the press that the state was standing by while
program participants cheated taxpayers.
The second lesson derives from Rhode Island’s eventual thoughtful and
measured response. The response reflects an understanding that public
program demand is affected by the deterioration of the level of private,
employment-based coverage, particularly for low-income workers. It reflects
an understanding that not all instances of employment-based coverage are
created equal. Increasingly, again particularly in the case of low-income
workers, offers of coverage can be accepted only at a high cost-sharing price—
one that many low-income workers cannot pay.190 The response also reflects
an understanding that the government’s interest in slowing the erosion of
private coverage does not overcome the need to be fair about access to
government subsidies.

participation” in the public program and adding new § 40-8.4-12(f) which directs the Department
of Human Services to adopt regulations disqualifying for a period of time a person who refuses to
enroll in available employer-based coverage).
187. Id. § 2 (adding new § 40-8.4-12(a) which provides for premium support for employmentbased coverage pursuant to the terms of new § 40-8.4-12(b)).
188. Id. § 2 (adding new § 40-8.4-12(b)).
189. Compare RIte Care Stabilization Act, supra note 179, § 2 (creating new § 40-8.4-12(b))
with Freyer & Rowland, supra note 176, at A1 (discussing the draft bill’s inclusion of a five
percent cost-sharing provision).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41 (discussing the increasing incidence of high
cost-sharing requirements accompanying offers of health insurance to low-income workers).
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Initially, it was reported that Rhode Island would act to prevent crowd-out
by taking quite a hard line on the effect of access to private coverage on
enrollment in RIte Care.191 Instead, the state sought to protect private coverage
while treating low-income workers equitably. Under these circumstances,
equitable treatment entailed permitting low-income workers a similar
opportunity to obtain and retain insurance coverage, notwithstanding whether
the worker happened to be employed in a setting in which private coverage
was offered.
The principle of equitable treatment does not require government to ignore
the fact that a low income worker has access to private coverage. But it does
require that a worker not be made worse off—less able to secure and retain
health insurance coverage for her family—depending on the accident of a
particular workplace’s benefits package.192 Rhode Island eventually broadened
the scope of analysis beyond what Blumberg, Dubay and Norton call “target
efficiency,” and considered the fairness—the “horizontal equity”—
implications of RIte Care’s subsidy design. Rhode Island attempted to hew to
this principle by encouraging or requiring workers to take advantage of private
coverage opportunities, while assuring that the state will permit them to do so
with approximately the same cost-sharing responsibility as a low-income
worker with the same family income covered by the public program.
The Rhode Island experience may be recapitulated in Washington and in
state capitals when formal crowd-out analysis is undertaken of CHIP and other
recent public program expansions. The lessons from the Rhode Island
experience seem to be two-fold. First, governmental officials and advocates
supporting public program expansion should be aware of the apparent
inevitability of the emergence of some level of crowd-out in any public
program expansion. As the low-income workplace becomes less likely to offer
full health benefits to workers and their dependents, public programs will be
expanded to reach the working poor. The second lesson is that the response to
crowd-out—ideally formulated before front page articles appear—should
contemplate the complex nature of the task of efficiently expanding public
191. See Freyer & Rowland, supra note 176, at A1 (discussing draft language that would bar
RIte Care membership unless employer’s share of premium was quite low).
192. Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 53-59.
The crowd-out issue has the opportunity to focus the debate over how society will
evaluate the success of public insurance programs. On one hand is the goal of minimizing
the public cost per newly insured individual (target efficiency). On the other hand is the
goal of providing public income support in such a way that people in similar economic
circumstances receive similar levels of assistance (horizontal equity). The concern with
crowd-out, per se, touches only upon the efficiency with which a program targets public
dollars to the previously uninsured. While target efficiency is a relevant and important
component of judging the cost-effectiveness of particular programs, it is not the only
criterion against which new programs need to be evaluated.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

112

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:79

program access to the working poor. In reaching the working poor, public
programs will inevitably be reaching into a demographic group in which a
large percentage of people have some access to private coverage. As the
Rhode Island experience demonstrated, people have understandable and
legitimate reasons for favoring public coverage over the private coverage
associated with high levels of cost-sharing. A response to crowd-out should
not fight that reality, but should permit the public program to mesh smoothly
and efficiently with the changing economics of private-sector workplace
benefits, building in incentives for employers and low-income employees to
play by the rules.
The long-term implications of crowd-out in public program expansions
merit a few words. Here, we admittedly move onto more speculative ground,
but, if a few not unreasonable assumptions are granted, the long-term
implications could be significant. In particular, dynamics surrounding crowdout suggest a diminution of the importance of America’s system of private,
employment-based insurance and a concomitant increase in the significance of
public insurance, potentially reversing the traditional balance in America’s
mixed public-private health finance system.
The assumptions that underpin this scenario are several—but not
unreasonable. First, it seems reasonable to assume that the “new economy”
will continue to drive a fall-off in access to health benefits for low-income
workers. In particular, low-income workers are less likely to be offered
coverage,193 and, in particular, “peripheral” workers—part-time workers and
newer full-time workers are less likely to be offered coverage.194 If the “new
economy” continues to encourage job-shifting and part-time employment, then
it is reasonable to expect an increase in “peripheral” workers.
Second, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of health coverage will
continue to rise relative to background inflation. There is a recent revival of
dramatic premium increases.195 The drivers of this resurgence of price
inflation include the adoption of increasingly expensive technology, the
escalating use of increasingly expensive drugs and the aging of the
population.196 These causes of health coverage inflation seem unlikely to
diminish in the foreseeable future. Third, as the cost of coverage continues to
rise, it seems reasonable to assume that employers will continue to exhibit the
193. See Cooper & Schone, supra note 27, at 145.
194. See Farber & Levy, supra note 31, at 102.
195. See MILLER, supra note 21, at 5-7; Levitt et al., supra note 18, at 131-32. See also
Stephen Barr, Costs Rise 9% in Federal Health Plans; Third Year in a Row of Big Premium
Jumps, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1999, at A1.
196. See MILLER, supra note 21, at 9-18. See also Robert W. Dubois et al., Explaining Drug
Spending Trends: Does Perception Match Reality?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 234-35.
For seven conditions associated with treatment with pharmaceuticals, the drug treatment costs
over a three-year study period increased at a level ranging from 43% to 219%. Id.
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tendency to pass a portion of that increased cost on to employees,197
specifically in the form of increased cost-sharing for dependent coverage.198 In
particular, this effect will be felt by employees of smaller businesses and parttime workers.199
Fourth, it seems reasonable to assume that the trend of relatively flat
compensation levels for low-income workers200 will continue, as an
information-based economy rewards the well-educated and penalizes those
without education or technical skills. And fifth, it seems likely that the burden
of increased cost shifting on low-income workers and workers in small
businesses, particularly those with a large number of part-time workers, will
continue to result in a low rate of take-up of offers of employment-based health
coverage by these workers.201
Should these predictions prove more or less accurate, there will naturally
be pressure to continue to expand public programs to provide coverage for the
uninsured families of the working poor. Indeed, as Rhode Island worked
through its budgetary concerns with its comprehensive public insurance
expansion program, it concluded that the increasing demand for public
coverage was attributable in large part to the inability of workers to afford
private coverage.202 The Rhode Island General Assembly concluded that these
economic factors, rather than cheating by RIte Care enrollees, was the cause of
the program’s unexpected growth.203
In recent years, the rate of uninsurance has risen only gradually because
increases in public programs have masked the deterioration of employmentbased coverage.204 As pressure grows to provide coverage to the working poor
left uncovered as a result of workplace shifts, public officials are likely to
follow the thought process evidenced by the Rhode Island General Assembly.

197. See O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 17; RICE ET AL., supra note 34, at 31-32; Cooper
& Schone, supra note 27, at 147.
198. See RICE ET AL., supra note 34, at 63-64.
199. See David Dranove et al., “Competition” Among Employers Offering Health Insurance,
19 J. HEALTH ECON. 121, 135-38 (2000) (small firms and firms with a high percentage of parttime workers impose higher cost-sharing burdens on their employees).
200. See O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 12; Handler, supra note 25, at 4.
201. See Cooper & Schone, supra note 27, at 147 (low-income workers).
202. See RIte Care Stabilization Act, supra note 179, § 1(4), (5).
203. See text accompanying notes 179-85.
204. See Rowland et al., supra note 12 (“The 1988 through 1995 decline in employersponsored coverage would have produced a larger number of uninsured Americans had it not
been accompanied by an increase in Medicaid coverage.”). As has previously been noted, the
apparently temporary flattening of health care cost inflation and historically low rates of inflation
were associated in the late 1990s with a small increase in employment-based coverage. See
Holahan & Kim, supra note 33, at 194. The possibility that these two factors (historically low
unemployment and flat health care inflation) will continue into the future for any substantial
period of time seems quite remote.
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That path has two components. First, they will recognize that the pressure on
public programs is based on the dynamics of the workplace—and principally
on the growth in the cost of coverage to low-wage employees.205 Second, they
will come to realize that crowd-out is a complex factor in the consideration of
public program growth. As Rhode Island seems to have discovered, crowd-out
is not a significant cause of the growth pressure on public programs. Rather,
crowd-out must be taken into account in program design, in order to assure a
proper mesh between public and private coverage that both maximizes private
sector coverage and treats low-income workers equitably.206 If the five
assumptions discussed above hold, and if officials follow the path set out by
Rhode Island, then we will experience a steady growth of public programs
without substantial concern about crowd-out. 207
In addition to this negative point—that crowd-out is not a barrier to public
program expansion—there are three positive points related to the crowd-out
dynamic that suggest an accelerated shift in the health finance balance to
public programs. All are related to the fact that the public program expansion
of the last fifteen years has moved Medicaid and its related programs beyond
the destitute to the working poor, a progression that is likely to continue as
public program expansion reaches more and more deeply into the ranks of
employed Americans.
The first positive point is that the expansion of public programs may lessen
the stigma now attached to Medicaid participation. Insurance coverage is not
sufficient to provide health care to patients—health care providers must be
willing to participate in the insurance program and to treat appropriately the
patients covered by the insurance.208 As public programs expand, they cease to
be poverty programs, and thereby may shed their image which has caused
some health care providers to either shun Medicaid recipients or treat them
with less respect than privately insured patients. And it works both ways—as
health care providers cease treating participants in public programs differently,

205. This pressure will be exacerbated with a downturn in the economy and a drop in the rate
of employment. See supra notes 193-95.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 179-85.
207. As is noted above, the enrollment dips in public programs related to the uncoupling of
Medicaid from welfare have eroded public program enrollment. See UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 63. The correction of this problem, serious though it is, is
beyond the scope of this Article, which assumes that the steps suggested in the works described
above in note 63 can correct this erosion.
208. See Sidney Watson, In Search of The Story: Physicians and Charity Care, 15 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 353, 359-60 (1996); Sara Rosenbaum, Rationing Without Justice: Children and
the American Health System, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 1859, 1874-75 (1992).
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the program participants will be less inclined to feel that membership in the
public program sets them out as less than a full member of society.209
The second positive point is that the intermeshing of public and private
coverage may aid in establishing greater continuity of coverage for low and
moderate income Americans. Workers change jobs, and low-income workers
shift from private to public coverage as their employment circumstances
change.210 As the intermeshing of public and private coverage proceeds, lowincome workers are more likely to maintain coverage as their employment
status changes; the public program subsidy will rise or fall depending on the
degree of private coverage available in the workplace, but their membership in
a health plan could remain continuous. Low-income families would therefore
“have more reliable access to health coverage and a greater likelihood of
receiving both preventive and primary health care, leading to improved health
status.”211
The third positive point might seem not all that positive to some. Although
the Rhode Island experience and the studies of crowd-out associated with prior
Medicaid expansions suggest that crowd-out ought not be a barrier to public
program participation, expansions of public programs do appear to displace
private coverage to some degree.212 This effect is likely to become greater as
the income levels for public programs increase.213 The Rhode Island response
to crowd-out did not attempt to eliminate the displacement of private
coverage—such a result would have been inequitable for those low-income
workers with inadequate private coverage, or private coverage associated with
crushing levels of cost-sharing. Rhode Island’s remedial steps therefore
balanced an interest in protecting private coverage with a desire to treat lowincome workers equitably. Crowd-out, then, may be minimized, but it cannot
be eliminated. Crowd-out will, therefore, accelerate the expansion of public
programs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The expansion of Medicaid and related public programs responds to a
pressing need. Shifts in the labor economy have diminished the extent to
which workers—particularly low-income workers in new or part-time
employment—are covered by traditional employment-related health coverage.
States and the federal government have responded in the last fifteen years by

209. See Jennifer P. Stuber et al., Beyond Stigma: What Barriers Actually Affect the Decisions
of Low-Income Families to Enroll in Medicaid? 7 (July 2000), available at http://www.hfni.
gsehd.gwu.edu/#chsrp/pdf/stig.pdf.
210. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 63, at 16.
211. Id.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
213. See Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 58.
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expanding public programs to attempt to stem the tide of uninsurance.
Legislators have raised concerns that such expansions of public programs from
the ranks of the destitute to the working poor will crowd-out private coverage.
Crowd-out has manifested in Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and it will occur in the context of present and future expansions.
It arises in part, however, because the employment-based insurance system has
changed; the cost-sharing imposed on low-income workers, and particularly
those with new and part-time jobs, can exceed their ability to pay. Their
inclination to “drop” private coverage is therefore understandable, and antidisplacement measures that subsidize low-income workers’ cost-sharing
burdens must become a standard part of public program expansions.
Public and private coverage, then, has become enmeshed in two ways.
First, these two parts of our health insurance system, once geared to entirely
different populations, now substantially overlap at the level of low- and
moderate-income workers. Second, these low- and moderate-income workers
will increasingly, in response to concerns for crowd-out, be served by a hybrid
system, in which their coverage is financed in part by their employer, and in
part by a public program. The trajectory of workplace economics and the
rising cost of health coverage suggest that the dominance of the private
insurance system in America will continue to diminish, as public programs
move into the business of covering low- and moderate-income workers. Under
reasonable assumptions about the future cost of health care and the American
labor market, this trend can be anticipated to lead to a transformation of
America’s mixed public-private health insurance system from one dominated
by private coverage to one in which public coverage is the norm.

